Against the backdrop of accelerating quantum computing development, the US financial system is facing an unprecedented security transformation. In September 2025, the US Crypto-Assets Task Force officially received a policy proposal titled the "Post-Quantum Financial Infrastructure Framework (PQFIF)". This document is not only a technical roadmap but also a strategic blueprint, aiming to guide the comprehensive transition of the US financial system towards quantum safety, ensuring it maintains a competitive advantage globally.
The proposal's introduction has a profound background. For a long time, the public-key encryption technologies (such as RSA and ECC) relied upon by the financial system were considered unbreakable. However, the potential power of quantum computers could crack these algorithms almost instantly. Once quantum computers with "cryptography-relevant capabilities" emerge, the security of the existing system will be completely compromised. The US government has long been highly vigilant about this. The Executive Order in January 2025 and National Security Memorandum NSM-10 both explicitly stated that the complete migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) must be achieved by 2035. The financial industry, being the nation's lifeline, is at the forefront of this urgency.
The core value of PQFIF lies in "preparing for rain before it arrives." The existing "harvest now, decrypt later" attack model means that even if financial data is temporarily secure, it could be completely decrypted by quantum computers in the future. Therefore, this framework is built upon four pillars: first, automated vulnerability assessment, using AI tools to scan for vulnerable algorithms in the financial system; second, risk-based migration planning, prioritizing the protection of high-risk areas such as payments and custody; third, hybrid cryptography deployment, ensuring compatibility during the transition period; and finally, continuous monitoring and automated compliance, dynamically responding to global regulatory requirements.
In terms of technical design, PQFIF adopts a cloud-native, modular architecture, supports agile switching of encryption algorithms, cross-chain and cross-system integration, and upgrades Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) to support quantum key management. Simultaneously, a real-time compliance engine ensures the system remains aligned with US and international standards. The policy proposal also outlines a four-phase implementation path: starting with asset inventory and risk assessment, gradually moving into pilot programs, full-scale promotion, and continuous optimization.
However, the challenges are also significant. The computational overhead and signature size of post-quantum algorithms may impact system performance. Shortages of qualified talent, varying progress among third-party suppliers, and the complexity of compliance adaptation will all increase implementation difficulties. More importantly, the comprehensive migration is estimated to cost up to $71 billion, requiring financial institutions to carefully weigh the investment against the benefits.
Despite this, PQFIF is not merely a "defense manual"; it is positioned as a crucial engine for modernizing financial infrastructure. This represents the most significant paradigm shift since the birth of public-key cryptography in the 1970s and signifies the US attempt to seize the initiative in the era of simultaneous advancement in quantum and AI. As the document emphasizes, quantum safety is not the end goal but the cornerstone for launching next-generation financial services.
Through this framework, the US demonstrates to the world: the financial security of the quantum era must be built now.
